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1. Comment on a definition which cannot be avoided 
 International migration is a subject of study where the interests of many disciplines meet. For 
a demographer migration is, above all and most naturally, the mass phenomenon of the movement of 
people across geographical space, provided that population size or structure (or, in other words, 
population reproduction) are significantly affected. Simple as it may seem, migration is by no means 
easy to define and operationalise. What hampers attempts at a plausible and sound definition is the 
lack of a clear-cut understanding of the movement itself, or, more specifically, confusion surrounding 
its two principal dimensions: distance and duration. Moreover, migration - inter alia due to its 
integrally double-ended character (movement from the area of departure to the area of arrival) and a 
metamorphic character (e.g. an instant change of the intended settlement in an alien geographical 
area into a return to the place of origin) - might be perceived as a process rather than an event. Unlike 
other basic demographic phenomena such as birth, death or even the conclusion of a conjugal union, 
it occurs in a time interval (sometimes of considerable duration), rather than at a particular moment1. 
 Due to such a predicament, a lot of arbitrariness is embedded in practically all definitions of 
migration. Thus the definitions of migration may substantially differ between countries and over 
time. As argued by various authors before, a great part of the observed variety of the definitions, 
either regarding the apparently similar form of migration viewed by different observers, or various 
forms viewed by the same observer or - finally - the same form viewed by the same observer, 
stem from policy rather than cognitive/academic premises. This diagnosis is hardly encouraging for a 
researcher. 
 Though it would seem nearly suicidal for a demographer to enter a migration analysis 
without prior juxtaposing and defining of applied categories and concepts (as well as without 
discussing of their comparability among countries), I have ventured to do so in this paper. And it 
needs to be clearly admitted - with the full awareness of the risks involved. 
                                                                                       
1 In addition, a substantial part of routine information on migration originates from the declarations of intention 
rather than the evidence on actually completed flows, i.e. most of it is of ex ante (as opposed to ex post) character. 
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2. Objectives and contents 
 According to a common universal wisdom, we live in the era of migration2 in which 
people are on the move3, probably much more than ever before and definitely with much broader 
territorial range. I do not intend to address the question already discussed by other authors: 
whether or not the world is on the move?4. I would rather focus on the causes and effects of 
that phenomenon, referring explicitly to the recent experience of Europe. 
 The topic of this paper might bring to mind a Europe once besieged - of the continent 
whose border was once along the banks of the Oder and Nysa rivers. For is it possible to speak of 
any real migration pressure on the part of Europe that lies to the east of the Oder and Nysa? 
 Seen from such a perspective the context of migration processes in Europe would only be 
two, largely complementary, processes: globalisation and regionalisation. Globalisation, which 
requires the principle of openness, would create conditions conducive to migration pressure. 
However, the second process, regionalisation, would lead to its minimisation or neutralisation. 
While not negating the significance of these processes for the most recent European migrations, 
a close look at migration since the end of the 1980s refutes the stereotype of the dominant role of 
compass-like South-West, and East-West, migration. 
 I aim to show that intra-European mobility, especially the processes which arose in 
Central and Eastern Europe after the Berlin Wall had collapsed, has played a decisive role in 
population movements since the end of the previous decade. This is worth to be emphasised, 
even repeatedly, because some analysts have a tendency to miss the fact that Europe consists not 
only of Western Europe but also Central and Eastern European countries aspiring to join the 
European Union, and still something else, namely Russia and a dozen of other countries. There 
is no justification for this blind spot. 
 The analysis presented in this paper, - whose focus is the complexity of international 
migration movements in Europe, including all their forms and geographical directions - does not 
only provide arguments supporting the thesis of the predominant (in both a quantitative and 
structural sense) role of migration within Europe - above all within the former socialist countries 
but also from Eastern Europe to Western Europe and within the European Union. This analysis 
also suggests that the influx from outside of Europe - the so-called pressure - has decreased 
(relatively and after 1994 absolutely as well). 
 The stereotype of migration pressure to a great extent finds more acceptance by the 
Wests perception of migration than by the reality of migration processes. 
 This paper is organised as follows. At first I outline the overall, global context of 
European migrations and then go on to characterise the fundamental categories of migration 
flows placing them in a political or economic context. More specifically, I present their 
relationship with three fundamental phenomena: globalisation, specifically European 
regionalisation and the processes which arose in relation to the fall of the communist system. 
Later on I present reflections on the topic of selected - in my opinion the most important - 
consequences of these movements. In the conclusion I examine the reaction of European 
societies to the new migration reality and the most likely track of migration policies. 
                                                                                       
2 See e.g. Castles and Miller (1993) 
3 A number of recent reports and analyses addressed the issue of contemporary international migration under such a 
motto (e.g. Council of Europe, 1993). 
4 See e.g. Coleman (1993). 
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3. Basic trends: the global context 
 It is of little doubt for a student of migration that the 1980s and 1990s were the decades of 
greatly diversified international population movements all around the world. This, according to 
many analysts, was in line with accelerated (or, as some authors would say, new) 
globalisation5. 
 Globalisation owes this new course to a blend of factors which came to the fore in the 
late 1970s and afterwards. They include: deregulation of the highly developed economies 
combined with a wider opening up of the less highly developed countries; TNC/corporate 
expansion due to more friendly oligopolistic inter-firm competition; an easier transfer of more 
and more advanced technologies; universal availability of means (information, 
telecommunication and transportation) designed to penetrate (either actually or virtually) the 
globe; the (institutionalised) collaboration on a world scale in the matters of transnational 
concern, and the undermining of national sovereignty in such areas as finance, environmental 
hazards/pollution, human rights, foreign trade, etc. Perhaps the demise of the Soviet Union and 
cessation of bi-polarity in international political relations has also been of great relevance6. 
 In seeking a direct link between globalisation and international migration, Morawska 
points out that the restructuring of national economies in the core countries (who also happen 
to be the net immigration countries), in addition to giving the rise to development of the 
highly skilled professional sector, has replaced the lower class with an underclass, and has 
created a growing informal sector largely isolated from mainstream advancement/integration 
opportunities [Morawska, forthcoming]7. On the other hand, many authors suggest that, 
contrary to a popular unidirectional view of globalisation, it has recently proven to be a 
highly dialectic process where decentralisation is continuously counterbalanced by 
centralisation, universalism by particularism, homogenisation by differentiation and 
integration by fragmentation8. 
 All in all, at this point of time the outcome of the recent globalisation constitutes the 
present world system which is characterised by unprecedented reach and intensity of 
symbolic (cultural, institutional) interactions and physical flows. 
 By and large many new phenomena related to globalisation - especially the 
metaphorical reduction of distances due to a faster, less costly and more widely available 
transportation network - seem conducive to accelerated movements of persons9. However, a 
grain of scepticism is being uttered from time to time by those focusing on the process of 
globalisation [who] note that although there has been a tendency to free the flows of goods 
and capital, there has been no parallel trend at the global level to free the flows of people 
(Zlotnik, 1998, 430). 
                                                                                       
5 Globalisation, whose origins date back to the late 19th century, finds its economic expression in accelerated 
movement of tangible and intangible goods and services across national borders through trade, investment and the 
flows of people, where less control of governments is exercised. Some authors view it as a centrifugal process, a 
process of economic outreach, and a microeconomic phenomenon, dominated by activities of individual actors and 
spurred by the pressures of competition (Oman, 1997, 29). From a non-economic perspective, it is usually 
perceived as the universalisation of cultural values and world outlooks, facilitated by the global media and the 
compression of time and space. Wallersteins school of thought would certainly see globalisation a set of 
increasing - but fundamentally asymetric - interactions between the expanding core/centre (the West) and the 
subordinate periphery of the (capitalist) world economy and human domain in general. 
6 Dahrendorf (1997) metaphorically speaks of a newly emerged competitive universe due to the shrinkage of the 
conventionally conceived second world and third world (which now, with minor exceptions, embraces only 
Sub-Saharan Africa). 
7 Originally the author refers primarily to the United States but to me the trend is of much wider coverage. 
8 For a more specific description of those opposite tendencies, see e.g. Featherstone et al. (1995), Morawska (1997) 
and Robertson (1992). 
9 Also a literary shortening of cultural distances through the universalisation of mass culture by means of i.a. 
recent advancements in telecommunication technologies is often being mentioned in the literature as a relevant 
factor. 
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 This particularly pertains to the flows of migrants, which have hardly matched tourist 
movements on the international scale, whose total number rose from around 69 million in 1960 
to around 454 million in 199010, not to mention the flows of goods or money. In contrast, 
between 1965 and 1990, migration led to, at best, a moderate increase in the proportion of 
foreign-born persons in the total populations. Although on the global scale, the number of 
documented persons of this kind alone rose by nearly 60 per cent, that did not affect the share of 
those persons in the total population of the world (2.3 per cent). 
 The size of the documented migrant stock was around 120 million in 1990 (United 
Nations, 1998). An estimated population of over 30 million undocumented foreigners (whose 
number seemed to have increased considerably over the last 20 years or so) might be added to 
that figure (Stalker, 1994). Parallel to this, the 1980s saw a dramatic increase in the flows of 
people in need of protection11. The total number of refugees alone, which in early 1980 was 
estimated at over 8 million, reached 15 million in early 1990. A similarly high level was 
maintained throughout the 1990s although a gradual decline has been observed since 1994 
(UNHCR, 1996). Despite such great numbers of foreign-born persons recorded around 1990 and 
thereafter, and a lot of other evidence which points to that towards the end of the twentieth 
century many countries have liberalised their control on entry, which particularly affected groups 
of migrants denied lawful access to those countries before, and that, indeed, the flows - mobility 
in general and migration in particular - in many areas of the world have greatly intensified12, 
neither the level nor the trends experienced by international migration - as Zlotnik aptly argues - 
have been striking (1998, 432). 
 What really distinguishes the final quarter of this century from earlier periods of 
contemporary history of human migration is something other than what stems from the global 
and highly aggregate figures. It is above all the spatial diversity of flows. What makes that 
diversity so distinct is not so much the universal availability of non-costly and fast transportation 
due to which no country remains unaffected and international migrants can be found everywhere. 
A fundamental novelty lies in that many more regions and countries than before (some of them 
closely isolated from the rest of the world until recently) have become either important 
destinations or important sources of international migrants. 
 The following areas have joined Canada, the United States, Australia, Germany and a few 
other western European countries in attracting large numbers of international migrants of 
diversified origin: in Western Asia - Israel and a group of states that form the Gulf Co-operation 
Council; in Southeast Asia - Japan along with the newly industrialised economies; in Southern 
Europe - Italy, Spain and Greece; in Central and Eastern Europe - the Russian Federation and 
certain other countries in transition; and in Western Africa - Ivory Coast (Cote dIvoir). In turn, 
examples of important sending countries include: Mexico in Latin America; all countries located 
on the Indian sub-continent; post-Soviet countries of Central Asia; China, the Philippines and 
Vietnam in Eastern Asia; Burkina Faso in Western Africa; and the Russian Federation and 
Ukraine in Eastern Europe. 
 Furthermore, a worldwide statistical analysis based on country-specific data on foreign-
born population for 1965 and 1990 revealed that both the median size of migrant population and 
the interquartile range had increased considerably, by 110 and 87 per cent, respectively. That 
implies not only an upward trend in the number of migrants but also a growing variation among 
receiving countries with respect to their migrant population. The analysis reaffirms this finding 
in terms of the share of international migrants in the total population of host countries, and leaves 
no doubts as to the growing diversity of those countries (Zlotnik, 1998). 
                                                                                       
10 World Tourism Organization, quoted after Zlotnik (1998). 
11 Refugees, asylees and temporary protection persons are usually not included in the estimates of migrant stocks (or 
flows). 
12 See e.g. Castles and Miller (1993), Coleman (1993), Macura (1994), Skeldon (1997), Stalker (1994), United 
Nations (1998) and Zlotnik (1998). 
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 The present-day variation of international migration becomes even more obvious when 
compared with that observed at the turn of the twentieth century. Contemporary (im)migrants 
themselves are - as suggested by Morawska (forthcoming) - much more diverse in their regional 
origins, racial identifications, gender and home country socio-economic backgrounds and 
cultural orientations and, in the host society, in their legal status, the sector of the economy they 
are employed in, and their modes of acculturation to the dominant society. 
 The relationships between new phenomena in international migration and the recent 
phase of globalisation are seriously obstructed by many factors such as sharply different time 
frames of the two phenomena and various external interferences, especially the politicisation of 
migration, and therefore not so easy to observe and study. From an analytical perspective, the 
issue of the incompatible time frames seems of primary importance because migration may 
always be subject to short-term fluctuations and sudden ups and downs, influenced jointly by a 
synergy of many factors and simple actions of individual actors; whereas globalisation is a long-
term, relatively stable and unidirectional trend to which the contribution of individual actors and 
single factors is usually modest. 
 Those relationships appear by no means straightforward. Perhaps one of the few 
exceptions is the impact of the recent globalisation on the growth of flows of highly skilled 
professionals, which reflects the restructuring of the world economy and a new global division of 
labour13. In large part it is related to the expansion of TNCs and takes the form of extraterritorial 
movements of persons. The movements of highly skilled labour have become much more 
complex than before, and hardly resemble the past pattern of a highly unidirectional periphery-
to-core brain drain (e.g. Koser and Salt, 1997; Rudolph, 1997 and Salt, 1997a). On the other 
hand, probably the most highly distorted are the volumes of migrant flows or their geographical 
directions. Theoretically, more deregulation/liberalisation in the world economy, which might be 
perceived as a tendency now, should be conducive to a higher volume of international trade and 
levelling of wage rates between countries which ultimately might result in the lowering of 
international migration. In reality, however, the opening up of less developed countries and the 
tightening of their economic ties with the rest of the world usually produces, at least temporarily, 
the opposite effect, sometimes called migration hump. This means that the flows of 
international migrants from less to more developed countries intensify (Martin and Taylor, 
1996). In response many receiving countries adopt various anti-immigrant measures which to a 
degree limit the flows and partly shift them from a documented into an undocumented channel or 
from one host country to another. 
 From among other phenomena that have conspicuously been shaping the present world, 
new means of penetrating the globe (a dense network of jets criss-crossing the air, wide access to 
the internet and satellite information system, the global reach of telephone and television 
network, etc.) seem to have greatly contributed to the development and effectiveness of migrant 
networks and migration-supporting business. To use a frequent case from my recent research as 
an illustration, a Sri Lankan travelling nowadays to Germany, having neither documents nor 
money does not feel lost and helpless in Belarus or almost anywhere else if he is equipped with a 
magnetic telephone card thanks to which he may instantly request cash from a nearby cousin or 
friend, or get guidance from a trafficker (Okólski, 1999a). 
 Similarly, the present-day internal conflicts generate much more sizeable waves of 
external refugees than before, involving the refugees who do not necessarily seek asylum in the 
nearest safe country but - with an increasing intensity - head for destinations with well-
established migrant networks or those offering the most favourable terms of protection, no matter 
how far located. 
                                                                                       
13 A recent analysis suggests that flows of highly skilled migrant workers (although still relatively small, compared 
to other flows of migrants) are increasing at a faster rate than those of less skilled (documented) workers (Salt, 
1997a). 
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 In turn, intensifying economic and social restructuring typical of the present development 
of the core economies which brings about such phenomena as an increasingly segmented labour 
market and high demand for irregular workers, attracts and indeed sucks more and more 
migrants from the periphery of the globe, and ultimately creates ethnic migrant communities, 
who in many instances are rejected or separated from the local populations. 
 Finally, the collapse of the Soviet bloc and the following opening up of the former 
communist countries and, to a degree, certain totalitarian states of East Asia (China and 
Vietnam), which altogether account for around 29 per cent of the total world population (1995) 
and a large part of Asia and Europes territory, triggered off a variety of peoples movements of 
global reach. It gave rise to four major geographically-different types of flows: intensified 
migration among those countries, westward outflow from those countries, and - in the case of the 
European countries that formerly belonged to the Soviet bloc - inflow from the South (but also 
from the West) and transit South-West migration. By all means those movements significantly 
contributed to the overall volume and diversity of international migration in the 1990s. 
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4. Basic trends in the Old Continent: can we really speak of migration pressures on Europe? 
 4.1. Introduction 
 Over the last two decades or so Europe experienced rather non-uniform (if not confusing) 
migration trends. First of all, its status as a net immigration region has been reinforced. However, 
after the rise of migration movements during the 1980s and the early 1990s, since 1993 a decline 
in the flows has been observed (OECD, 1998). Referring to official records (and each specific 
national definition of migration) of each country, the aggregate (minimum14) level of foreigner 
inflow to 16 countries of Western Europe15 in 1990 can be estimated at 134 per cent of the 1980 
level (approx. 1.2 million) and in 1997 at 84 per cent of the 1990 level (approx. 1.6 million)16. 
For the 13 countries considered, the peak immigration year fell in the period 1990-1994; it was a 
little earlier in the case of Iceland and Norway and a little later in the case of Denmark. On the 
other hand, in some countries (e.g. Belgium, Germany, Switzerland and the United Kingdom) the 
outflow of foreign residents, which did not change much during the 1980s, strongly intensified in 
the early 1990s whereas in many other countries it remained relatively stable (Salt, 1997b). In 
turn, the outflow of citizens of Western European countries has been generally on the decline, at 
least as evidenced by the immigration statistics of major overseas destinations. 
 Migration statistics in the former socialist countries of Central Europe show a rather low 
and stable, if not declining (Slovakia), level of inflow for the 1990s; it ranged from approx. 1,000 
(Bulgaria, Romania) to 10,000-15,000 (the Czech Republic and Hungary) annually17. The trends 
and levels with respect to the outflow were a little more diversified in that part of Europe. While 
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Slovakia hardly recorded any large-scale emigration (the 
actual numbers below 1,000 on a yearly basis), the emigration from Bulgaria, Poland and 
Romania reached a considerable size. In Bulgaria it was the highest and (after 1991) relatively 
stable (at the level of approx. 60,000), whereas in the two remaining countries after a rise in the 
early 1990s, since 1995, when the peak (approx. 25,000) was reached, a gradual decline has been 
taking place18. 
 According to a plausible estimate, in the mid-1990s Europe hosted almost 22.5 million 
(documented) foreign residents, which (in the case of its western part19), despite a significant and 
steady deceleration of growth, meant a 31-per cent increase relative to 1988 (Salt, 1997b)20. 
Between 1980 and 1996 the share of foreign residents in the total population of the top four 
countries21 increased in the following manner: Germany - from 7.2 to 8.9 per cent; the United 
Kingdom - from 2.8 to 3.4 per cent; Switzerland - from 14.1 to 19.6 per cent; and Italy - from 0.5 
to 1.7 per cent. 
                                                                                       
14 For some countries the figures do not include certain categories of migrants (e.g. the French data include only 
migrant workers and foreigners admitted on family reunification grounds). 
15 Austria and Portugal are not included here. 
16 In fact, the most recent available data (usually for 1997 but in some cases for 1996 or even 1995) were used for 
the latter estimate. 
17 Distinct exceptions are the trends observed in Hungary and Poland. In the former, after a sharp decline in 1991/92 
(following a dramatic rise in 1988-1990, up to nearly 40,000 immigrants), the inflow has levelled off, while in the 
latter immigration seems to be continuously increasing (from 2,600 in 1990 to 8,400 in 1997). 
18 Both countries recorded approx. 20,000 emigrants in 1997. 
19 Accounting for 87.5 per cent of the European total. 
20 According to the UN estimate, migrant stock (the size of the foreign-born population) in Europe rose from 23.0 to 
25.1 million between 1985 and 1990 which brought about an increase in its share in the regions total population 
from 3.0 to 3.2 per cent (United Nations, 1997). The magnitudes of migrant stocks as estimated by the UN and Salt 
are not fully consistent due to differences in the definition. 
21 According to the stock of foreign population (in absolute terms); France not included. 
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Apart from migratory flows recorded by national statistics of respective countries, in 
recent years Europe also received great numbers of asylum seekers, foreigners granted the 
temporary protection status and undocumented migrants. As far as the first of these three 
categories is concerned, the trend was from very low levels (tens of thousands annually) in the 
beginning of the 1980s to approx. 700,000 in 1992 and to about a half of that level in 1994. The 
issue of temporary protected persons emerged ad hoc mainly as a consequence of the civil war in 
Bosnia-Herzegovina, and the movements of those people might be regarded as a short-lived 
phenomenon. Nonetheless, in early 1997 nearly 837,000 citizens of that country could be found 
elsewhere in Europe, many of them with no intention of returning home (Salt, 1997b). Finally, 
many migrants entering European countries remain undocumented (even approximate numbers 
are unknown). One group among those persons constitutes illicit migrants. According to the 
ICMPD estimate, in 1993 approx. 350,000 foreigners entered Western Europe illegally 
(Widgren, 1994). Some reports suggest that since around the mid-1990s the number of illegal 
entries into Europe might be declining. Probably a much larger group among the undocumented 
foreigners, however, are irregular migrants who come legally as tourists but overstay (or take 
employment) without due authorisation. 
 All those estimates hardly take into account the flows of foreigners, be it documented or 
not, composed of persons classified as non-migrants. This comprises a wide range of categories: 
from ethnic German resettlers to students and seasonal workers. The annual inflow of those 
persons to all European countries in the 1990s might be as high as over 600,00022. 
 Even leaving aside the population movements within the successor states of the former 
Soviet Union23 and former Yugoslavia (which are not specifically dealt with here), the above list 
of movements and related estimates provides ample ground to conclude that Europe has been an 
arena of high and increasingly diversified international mobility of people. That mobility, 
however, has displayed various, sometimes not quite consistent, time trends and sub-regional 
patterns. The interpretation of such a complex picture requires reference to a multitude of factors 
or contexts. In order to introduce my interpretation, which is presented throughout the rest of this 
paper, I will briefly discuss the relevance of three groups of factors: globalisation, regionalisation 
and political restructuring. 
 First of all, the new course of globalisation, due to inter alia strong competition from 
East Asia, has to a large degree undermined the relatively stable central position of Europe in the 
world economy. In order to preserve their competitive power, European states have been forced 
into a drastic reduction of public spending and into accepting the growing social disparities. With 
the gradual withdrawal of the state from the social and economic sphere, firms became more free 
to apply various cost-of-labour-lowering measures, which included much larger job offers 
addressed to low-paid, flexible or irregular workers. Paradoxically, in the 1990s growing 
unemployment in many European countries went hand in hand with a relatively high, if not 
increasing, demand for cheap foreign labour. South-North and East-West wage differentials have 
remained large enough to lure great masses of migrant workers ready to take up jobs 
symbolically described as triple-ds for dirty, dangerous and demanding24. 
                                                                                       
22 The inflow of ethnic Germans to Germany involves more than 200,000 each year, the inflow of seasonal migrant 
workers to countries officially practising this kind of foreigner employment - more than 300,000 (the mid-1990s) 
and the inflow of temporary skilled workers - from few tens of thousands to more than 100,000 (a decline from 
130,000 in 1992 to 70,000 in 1996). With regard to foreign students, in 1980 16 western countries recorded 346,300 
students enrolled at the post-secondary level, in 1988 around 423,900 and in 1992 around 523,900 (Salt, 1997a). In 
addition, the number of foreign students in the former socialist countries may be well in excess of 100,000, and it is 
also growing in recent years. 
23 For a thorough description of the international population movements within the former USSR, see Okólski, 
1998a. 
24 On the other hand, the flows of migrants have been prompted by another fact of globalisation - the progress in 
telecommunication and transportation technologies, and their widespread access. 
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 Therefore one of the main elements of the recent globalisation has been the evolution of 
the labour market25. Worldwide competition26, which has become compelling for economic 
actors in both public and private spheres, requires a high level of elasticity of labour markets as a 
means of the reducing labour cost. The following measures are typically found in the attempt to 
reduce labour costs: cutting out non-wage elements of the cost, outsourcing, recruiting higher 
proportions of part-time or temporary workers, offering very low-paid jobs, etc. At the same 
time, the demand has grown for highly skilled professionals engaged in company activities 
related to cost management. As a result, labour has come to be highly segmented, and 
(particularly in the West) it is characterised by the re-emergence of huge wage differentials, 
enormous diversity, instability and uncertainty of careers, and a relatively large proportion of 
people steadily excluded (Dahrendorf, 1997). 
 Second of all, there has emerged another new phenomenon of relevance to European 
migration - regionalisation. Regionalisation in general terms is seen as a centripetal process, 
which purposefully (rather than spontaneously) leads towards the greater integration of two or 
more countries. One of the principal aims of this process is to enhance the regions growth and 
strength, and to increase the sovereignty of regional institutions vis-à-vis the rest of the world 
(Oman, 1997). European regionalisation has taken a rather extreme form, i.e. of an exclusive 
process involving highly selective membership, deep and mandatory deregulation within the 
region and tight control of links with third countries (Okólski, 1998b). From the perspective of 
population mobility, it allows for free movements of the regions residents in all possible forms, 
and at the same time it heavily limits the inflow of third countries nationals. As a matter of fact, 
in the 1990s restrictions on the entry of third country nationals have become an element of the 
doctrine of European regionalisation. 
 Finally, a separate factor which probably should be taken into consideration when the 
remodelling of the European migration pattern is discussed, has been a new political 
configuration of Europe as a result of the lifting of the iron curtain, and (gradually since 1988) 
the opening up of the eastern part of the continent to population movements. The Central and 
Eastern European revolution of the late 1980s and early 1990s has given rise to the vehement 
movements of people assuming a large variety of directions, compasses and forms. Those 
seemingly simple to interpret developments, however, run parallelly to the migration phenomena 
of a much more complex context, namely those being adverse effects of the accompanying 
collapse of union or federal communist states, like the ex-USSR and the former FSR Yugoslavia, 
i.e. huge flows of involuntary migrants. 
 It might be argued that in Europe all those three - recently emerged, to be sure - groups of 
factors influenced the population movements through the interplay with other two factors of a 
very special meaning and long standing: geographical dimension and historical legacy. On the 
one hand, due to its geographical character, especially in the age of the compression of time and 
distance, Europe is probably more than other parts of the globe exposed to people movements. 
In the case of numerous countries it lacks distinct natural internal borders, it is the westernmost 
corner of the huge landmass of Asia, and the Mediterranean Sea links rather than divides it from 
Africa (Geldner, 1997, p. 19). In other words, viewed from a purely physical dimension, Europe 
is widely open to the penetration of a large majority of the worlds population. This factor seems 
particularly influential in the case of migrants from North African, West Asian (including those 
from the Middle East) and European countries with no clear motive or preference concerning the 
destination of their movement. 
                                                                                       
25 See e.g. Lim (1997). 
26 Probably more than to other factors, competition and deregulation of markets owe its new global reach to two 
principal phenomena: worldwide availability of information, its universality and simultaneousness, and the 
international nature of the financial sector with all its related services. 
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On the other hand, historically-rooted ties facilitate migration within Europe. From early 
mediaeval years up to now - as brilliantly evidenced by Foucher (1993) - there has been a 
continuous (although erratic and by no means unidirectional) penetration and intermingling of 
European states, nations and societies, with respect to institutions, economy, population, science, 
art, religion, etc. which resulted in relatively close cultural, economic and institutional proximity 
among the countries. This also partly applies to the links between Europe and non-European 
countries, especially countries where the Europeans have predominated among the settlers or - 
albeit to a much lesser degree - certain former colonies (mainly French and British) in Africa and 
Asia. Those ties continue to play a particularly important role in ethnicity- or network-driven 
migration. 
 4.2. Globalisation and European migration 
 As stems from the examination of recent global migration trends, the effects of 
globalisation upon those trends are by no means unambiguous. Europe seems to be no exception 
to the rule. 
 Official statistics together with research reports are in agreement that in the 1980s and 
1990s, despite the abandonment of active recruitment of foreign labour, Europe continued to host 
scores of migrant workers or even the more so the family members of those who came to work in 
earlier period. As Hammar (1997, 7) puts it, the European liberal democracies could not 
convince but a small minority of those already since years working as guest workers that they 
should now return to their countries of origin. Most of these workers did not leave but instead 
invited their families to join them in the immigration countries. 
 In some European countries a greater geographical diversity of the origin of those 
migrants was observed. A distinct novelty has been the arrival of migrants from remote countries 
of Asia and, to a lesser degree, Africa. For instance, since the 1980s Europe has been witnessing 
an intensive inflow of people from such countries as China, Iran, Lebanon, Philippines, Senegal, 
Vietnam and many others, and the numbers of migrants from countries like Morocco and 
Turkey, the already established leaders in the inflow to Europe, further increased (United 
Nations, 1998)27. 
 At the same time, the outflow to non-European destinations seemed to be on the decline 
or at best stable. For instance, the United States, by and large the main destination country for the 
European outmigrants, recorded almost perfectly stable inflow of people from Europe during the 
1980s (between 60,000 and 70,000 persons per year, until 1988). Although between 1989 up to 
1994 the number of immigrants increased (to around 160,000), it was entirely due to the inflow 
of people from Central and Eastern Europe, mostly (especially since 1991) ethnic Jews from the 
ex-USSR28. Since 1994 immigration from Europe to the USA has been slowly decreasing. In 
relative terms, the inflow of citizens of the western European countries declined from 11.7 per 
cent in 1975-1979 to 6.8 per cent in 1990-1994 (UN, 1998). 
 Conspicuously, over the last 20 years or so certain countries known in the past as net 
outmigration areas changed their status to become net immigration areas. 
 In addition, there occurred (especially in the 1990s) a shift from the predominance of 
long-term (mostly, for settlement) to the predominance of short-term movements (OECD, 1998). 
                                                                                       
27 For instance, during the 1980s the number of (documented) European residents from Morocco increased by a 
quarter of a million (50 per cent) and from Turkey by 400,000 (30 per cent). The growth continued into the early 
1990s (probably until 1993). 
28 For instance between 1991 and 1996 the inflow of persons born in western European countries declined from 
55,000 to 53,000. 
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Those basic trends might find only a partial explanation within the framework of ongoing 
globalisation. The central position in the world economy, which is still occupied by Europe, 
implies relatively high labour productivity and consequently, relatively high wage rates in the 
majority of European countries. This fact alone keeps large numbers of European workers from 
migrating to third countries, especially since the movement to any attractive destination (e.g. 
North America) involves high transaction costs and facing migrants from other continents 
endowed with comparable skills but probably more prone to accept jobs at competitive terms. On 
the other hand, thanks to the same factor, i.e. the position in the world economy, in recent years 
growing numbers of Europeans turned into easily transferable labour within the global corporate 
network29. This, however, remained an option for a small minority, namely, the most highly 
educated. 
 In turn, as already observed, the newly shaped (highly flexible and segmented) labour 
market attracts migrants from outside of Europe, even from very remote countries. The reason is 
that the lower/inferior segment of that market is undergoing sharp fluctuations marked by phases 
characterised by excess demand for labour. 
 Ultimately, the recent facts of globalisations suggest a (steady) positive net migration 
probably in a large majority of the European countries. While this seems also very obvious in the 
case of non-highly skilled workers, the balance in the case of professionals might largely be the 
opposite. 
 
 4.3. Regionalisation vis-à-vis migrant flows within the European Union 
 Since the conclusion of the Treaty of Rome in 1958, which provided for free movement 
by residents of the member states, the issue of international migration has become increasingly 
institutionalised in the process of the European integration. The major steps with regard to this 
were taken in the 1990s. First, the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (1992) included 
immigration and asylum as matters of common interest. Currently these issues (together with the 
crossing of external borders and few other) constitute what is known as the third pillar of the 
Union. On the other hand, by force of the Treaty, since 1993 the citizens of the Unions member 
countries are not only free to move within the Unions space but can also benefit from equal 
rights to access to the labour market, social security, health care, etc. Next, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (1997) foresees that the provisions of the hitherto intergovernmental Schengen 
Agreement (and the Dublin Convention)30 will be written in the Unions acquis and the issues of 
immigration and asylum will be given top priority and (after a five-year transitional period, after 
the ratification of the Treaty) transferred to the first pillar of the Union. Those recent steps reflect 
the striving towards combating and better control of illegal migration and the reduction of the 
number of asylum seekers (Lavenex, 1998). 
                                                                                       
29 By the same token, a growing number of expatriates is being employed in  various European outlets of American 
or Japanese TNCs.  
30 By means of those two conventions (1992) common immigration (or, rather, border control) policy and asylum 
principles were adopted by the co-signatories. 
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The impact of regional integration in Europe on people mobility within the area of 
European Communities could be observed as early as since the period immediately after 1969-
1974, when inter alia freedom of movement for persons became effective, first in case of the six 
founding members of then the European Economic Community (EEC) and a few years later in 
the case of the next three countries31, and the cessation of labour recruitment primarily affected 
inflow from third countries. An empirical analysis of international migration in the countries of 
EEC (until around 1990) led to the conclusion that the trend [was] towards less intra-
Community movement [...] and a sharp rise in immigration from outside the Community 
(Tapinos, 1994, 216). 
 Despite the free movement of people within EEC, the fast convergence of national 
economies (but probably also rising - since 1975 - unemployment) discouraged intra-Community 
flows of workers. In turn, despite potential competition (which did not occur) from migrants 
from within the Community and, a little later, the closing of the EEC external borders, the inflow 
of persons from third countries, primarily Turkey, the former FSR Yugoslavia and the Sub-
Saharan region continued at a very high level. This was mainly due to the external pressures 
accompanying a high demand in EEC for labour accepting low wages and demanding work. 
According to the lesson from that phase of European integration, as Tapinos (1994, 220) 
suggests, the dynamics of migration show that market forces - the conditions surrounding labour 
supply and demand, and the nature of economic growth - have had a greater impact than 
institutional factors, such as in the case of EEC member countries, the institutional introduction 
of freedom of movements, or, for non-member countries, the closure of frontiers. 
 Migration trends observed within the European Union after 1992 seem much less clear 
than before. Several general tendencies, such as declining documented flows, predominance of 
migrants admitted on the basis of family reunification and further diversification of regions of 
origin, either find exceptions in various countries or show non-negligible deformations over time 
(OECD, 1998). In some EU countries migrants from within the Union tend to increase their 
shares in the total inflow and participation (relative to non-EU nationals) in the labour market 
(e.g. Austria, Germany, the United Kingdom) whereas in some others a parity at best is being 
maintained (e.g. Belgium, Denmark) or fluctuations which would be difficult to interpret are 
observed (e.g. France, the Netherlands). A spectacular case supporting the hypothesis that 
recently in the Union, nationals of EU might be forcing out other (legal) foreigners, is presented 
by Germany where the share of for example two other EU countries - Italy and Portugal - in the 
total net immigration increased from 3.9 to 25.6 per cent in 1993-1996. The Eurostat survey data 
(quoted by OECD, 1998) suggest that in 1996 in a large majority of countries of the European 
Union at least one-third of the foreign labour force originated from the Union itself, with three 
countries (Belgium, Ireland and Luxembourg) recording the share of those persons at over 70 per 
cent, and in only four countries (Austria, Greece, Italy and Portugal) the relevant proportion was 
relatively low (in fact, below 20 per cent). 
                                                                                       
31 Free movement of people for the residents of the founding countries (the Benelux countries, France, Italy and 
FRG) were introduced by the end of 1968, 10 years after the Treaty of Rome was signed. In the case of Denmark, 
Ireland and the United Kingdom it became effective almost instantly after the accession (which took place in 1972), 
whereas in the case of Greece it happened in 1988 (eight years after joining EEC) and in the case of Portugal and 
Spain in 1992 (six years after). 
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4.4. Fortress Europe: are the doors shut or only half-open? 
 The question arises then whether the institutional measures introduced by the European 
Union in the 1990s, within its doctrine of regionalisation, have taken an upper hand over the 
influences of globalisation which has been steered primarily by the virtues of international 
competition. It could unquestionably be so if not the great masses of foreigners entering 
Europe (and the European Unions countries in particular) under the guise of other categories, 
such as asylum seekers, persons seeking temporary protection, students, entrepreneurs, tourists 
or persons who are illegal migrants. I have already pointed out that for the 1990s the annual 
aggregate numbers of foreigners fitting into each of those categories might be expressed in 
tens, if not hundreds, of thousands, and that the overall magnitude of the inflow of those non-
migrants might be no less than that of the documented migrants. 
 Obviously many of those people are genuine non-migrants. The assumption that a large 
proportion (not to mention a majority) of them would qualify as such, would be hard to 
verify. However, doubts might be expressed concerning the time coincidence of the 
introduction of strict controls on migrant entry in Europe and a rapid increase in asylum 
claims, on the one hand, and of revisions and harmonisation of asylum laws in the European 
Union, and the blooming of trafficking in migrants from the very countries of origin of former 
asylum seekers. 
It would not therefore be an exaggeration to conclude that Europe still remains a 
migration pole of such attraction that people would move (or at least attempt to do so) to that 
region even when faced with severe obstacles. Consequently, it seems that for a relatively long 
time into the future migrants will be busy searching for effective ways to elude or circumvent 
institutional barriers and controls in order to make the shut doors half-open. Confronted with 
the diversity of flows and numbers of people involved, the region might not be able to resist 
the pressure. The widely acclaimed notion of fortress Europe will most likely continue to be 
a postulate rather than a fact of reality. 
 On the other hand, the tendency to select European countries as a destination by the 
nationals of third countries might be reinforced by the persistence, if not the expansion, of 
segmented labour markets in the Old Continent, with typical for them increasing division of 
between the jobs accepted by the indigenous workers and those left vacant for the foreigners 
(e.g. Lim, 1997). 
 
 4.5. European migration after the end of history 
 This is a paraphrase of the title of an inspiring paper by van de Kaa presented to the 1991 
European Population Conference (van de Kaa, 1993). The leitmotif of his predictions was that 
the collapse of communism would activate in Europe a huge migration potential embodied in the 
former USSR and its satellites. In particular, van de Kaa suggested (1993, 91) that the main 
direction of migration streams in Europe during the next decade or so will be from East to West. 
This hypothesis was supplemented by two other relevant hypotheses, namely that Central and 
Eastern European countries will experience a significant inflow of nationals of third countries, in 
particular from developing countries, and that in Western Europe migrants from the eastern part 
of the continent will to a large degree take a labour market niche occupied thusfar by migrants 
from the South. Have those projections come true? 
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Indeed, it appeared in the early 1990s that the East-West flows started to be a prevalent 
component of European migration. Seen from the West European perspective, that new trend 
was nearly obvious and expected, in view of the gradual lifting, since 1989, of major barriers that 
in the past prevented great numbers of Central and East Europeans from moving to the West. 
That expectation found strong support in the experience of a number of East-West emigration 
episodes, which have taken place since the post-Stalinist thaw of the mid-1950s. According to 
that experience, whenever the opportunities32 allowed, a massive mobilisation of people ready 
to emigrate took place, and almost instantly the number of emigrants from the East multiplied. 
 More importantly, European migration statistics for the late 1980s and early 1990s 
seemed to confirm the above prediction. Between 1985 and 1990 not only did the flows of 
people from East to West increase but in addition that increase was generally (with the distinct 
exception of Italy and Spain) faster than the growth of the immigration from the South33. The 
early 1990s saw a continuation (if not - in the case of certain countries of the East -acceleration) 
of that trend. In addition, an increased presence of the citizens of Central and Eastern European 
countries in the West was reflected in many other (not strictly migration) records. The number of 
tourists has virtually multiplied everywhere in Western Europe, and some western countries 
recorded intensified inflow of asylum-seekers or seasonal workers from the East. 
It quickly turned out, however, that the 1990s would not be a decade of East-West 
population movements. As early as around 1992 or 1993 westbound migration from the East 
started to slow down. In Germany, which probably receives from two-thirds to three-quarters of 
all Central and Eastern European migrants coming to the European Union, net migration in the 
case of Poles (a predominant nationality among the regions outmigrants) has been declining 
gradually since 1990 (118,000 in 1989 and 6,000 in 1996), in the case of Hungary since 1992, 
and in the case of Bulgaria and Romania since 1993, whereas in the case of the Russian 
Federation it has remained relatively stable (around 20,000 per annum). This trend was to a large 
extent reflected in changes in the number of foreign residents in Germany. While in 1985-1996 
the number of Poles fluctuated, in the case of other Central and Eastern European nationalities 
two clear tendencies were observed: an initial sharp rise (usually until 1992 or 1993) and a 
gradual decrease. Romania presents a typical case here: in 1985-1992 the number of the citizens 
of that country was increasing (from 77,000 to 167,000), and in the following years decreasing 
(101,000 in 1996). 
 Concomitant was a shift from permanent to temporary migration and a decline in the 
number of asylum-seekers inflow (Garson et al., 1997). All in all, despite liberalised regulations 
and step-by-step implemented freedom of movements in the home countries, and actually 
increased mobility of the Central and Eastern European population, its outflow to the West has 
begun to decrease, even before climbing to any spectacularly high level. The main reason behind 
this remarkable trend seems to be the Wests abandonment of a policy of (politically-motivated) 
preferential treatment for Central and Eastern European migrants, and submitting those migrants 
to the newly-developed restrictive rules of the fortress Europe after 1990. 
 An important lesson can be drawn from the above: migration takes a particularly high 
scale when it is - by this or another way, purposefully or unconsciously - encouraged by the 
institutions of the better-off receiving country, even under outflow-discouraging or prohibitive 
institutional circumstances in the sending country, and it may not respond to the changes in the 
institutional arrangement in the latter (e.g. the lifting of the previous restrictions) when the 
former discontinues its (institutional) support. 
                                                                                       
32 I.e. a politically-justified East-West deal concerning the transfer of people or an explicit commitment of the West 
to protect Easterners fleeing at the times of internal turmoil. 
33 According to Poulain (1993, 71), the prime trend in flows from Central and Eastern Europe [was] the exponential 
increase detected in Germany where the number of immigrants from that region increased from 267,000 to 
1,230,000. In comparative terms, the rise was from 97 to 272 Central and Eastern European migrants per 100 
migrants originating from the South. 
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 Taking a different perspective than the East to West migration, however, population 
movements in the post-communist Central and Eastern Europe in the 1990s were indeed so 
conspicuous to deserve to be placed among the key developments in European migration (Frejka, 
1996). Besides the somewhat traditional outflow to western countries, I have here in mind three 
new migration phenomena of similarly great importance in the region: firstly, an enormous 
intensification of international flows within the region; secondly, an influx of people from 
outside the region; and, thirdly, westbound transit migration. It is precisely the high intensity and 
great diversity of those flows that recently have led international migration analysts to describe 
Central and Eastern Europe ever more frequently as a new migration pole or a new migration 
space in the global arena. 
Convergent diagnoses prepared by many research centres attest to a considerably 
increased and indeed already very high international mobility of the regions population. They 
show, for instance, that from 1987 to 1994 about one third of western and central Ukrainian 
households were involved in relocations of that kind, while before 1987 foreign travel had been a 
rarity, and cases of migration noted by researchers had for the most part been connected with 
redeployments of Red Army units (Pirozhkov et al., 1997). A similar proportion found for Polish 
households suggests that in the 1990s nearly half of the population has benefited directly from 
proceeds gained as a result of migration (Frejka et al, 1998). 
As regards the mobility of people inside this part of Europe, the diversity of this 
phenomenon is particular and too great to allow even its brief presentation here. I will therefore 
restrict myself to a succinct indication of its basic elements (Okólski, 1998a). 
The first of them, and most important in terms of numbers, are voluntary resettlement 
flows between the countries that have emerged from the former USSR. Between 1991 and 1997 
they involved about 10 million people, and at their peak in 1994 over one million people flowed 
into Russia itself from the other former Soviet republics, while nearly a quarter of a million left 
Russia for the other former republics. 
The second element is a stream of refugees or persons in need of temporary protection. 
Although displaced persons from the former FSR Yugoslavia (over one million by early 1997, 
including over 600,000 outside the former Yugoslav borders) have taken refuge mainly in the 
West, yet the list of the top 25 receiving states includes six Eastern European countries. Hungary 
itself has offered refuge to nearly 80,000 former Yugoslav citizens. A stream of displaced 
persons from the areas of the former USSR affected by civil wars or exacerbated ethnic or 
national conflicts has assumed even greater proportions. Russia has received most of them, 
nearly one million by early 1996. A mass outflow of Romanian citizens, principally Roma and 
persons of Hungarian nationality, has also been of some importance in this context. Hungary, for 
example, has become the receiving country for some 60,000 Romanian asylum seekers. 
Migrations in search of employment are the third important component of internal Central 
and Eastern European migrations. There are two forms of such flows: an official one, 
documented with adequate permits; and an unofficial one, falling into the category of incomplete 
migration, to be discussed shortly. Legal migrations for work occur between all the countries of 
the region, with inflows decidedly prevailing in some of them and outflows in others. Actually, 
Albania is the only country not to have any significant links with the labour market of this part of 
Europe. Belarus, Bulgaria and, above all, Ukraine are examples of countries sending large 
numbers of workers to other states of the region, while the Czech Republic, Russia and Hungary 
are important receiving countries. Poland is a special case here, as it both receives labour from 
other countries (mainly form Ukraine) and sends its own nationals to work abroad (principally to 
the Czech Republic, though considerably more outside the region, mainly to Germany). 
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Finally, the fourth element of the international intraregional mobility is relatively new 
form, which might be termed incomplete migration. It involves persons described sometimes as 
false tourists, characterised by a flexible employment situation and, generally, a relatively low 
social status, persons ready to go abroad almost at any time and taking up various simple and 
extremely low-paid jobs, usually for short periods of time and without the permit required. The 
basic forms of employment are petty trade, household help, renovation and construction services, 
fruit picking, assistance at harvest, and sewing. Such persons are continually in touch with the 
members of their households remaining at home and actually spend most of their time with them. 
It is a transitory form of spatial mobility, with its source in structural imbalances on the domestic 
labour markets of many of the countries in the region, and in particular in a relative surplus of 
rural population. It substitutes, in part at least, for the formerly widespread commuting from the 
country to nearby towns or short-distance seasonal (internal) labour migrations. According to 
one estimate, in 1995 some 800,000 people came to Poland from Ukraine alone in such capacity 
(Okólski, 1998c). 
It might therefore be concluded, in view of the foregoing discussion, that the flows that 
have their origins in the fall of communist system in Europe have recently began to shape the all-
European migration trends. Owing to a close geographical proximity and the common history, a 
predominant proportion of migrants, exilees, asylum seekers and (more or less genuine) tourists 
from Central and Eastern Europe preferred moving within that region to leaving for anywhere 
else. 
The phenomenon of the inflow of irregular workers is completely new to Central and 
Eastern Europe and results from the increasing internal economic diversification of the region. 
Though very recent, it has already assumed large proportions and numerous forms. For instance, 
in the Czech Republic and Hungary such workers (among whom Ukrainians prevail) are for the 
most part employed under several months contracts, while in Poland and Russia under contracts 
for performance of a specific task, sometimes executed in the course of several days or weeks. 
One estimate quotes the number of 100,000 to 200,000 irregular foreign workers in the Czech 
Republic in 1997, as compared to 125,000 aliens holding work permits (Drbohlav, 1998). In 
Poland, a mere 18,000 foreigners were employed legally at the same time, while a few hundred 
thousand (probably over half a million) worked without permission. 
The second important stream turning Central and Eastern Europe into a region of 
migration influx is the immigration of aliens, sometimes whole families, coming to stay for 
longer periods, often with the intention to settle down. Though the settlement process is usually 
extended over many years, some countries of the region already have communities of foreigners, 
numbering from several thousand to between ten- and fifty thousand people, of nationalities 
rarely found in these countries before 1990. The spectacular examples are: the Chinese 
community in Hungary, the Chinese and Vietnamese communities in the Czech Republic, and 
the Vietnamese and Armenian communities in Poland. A certain influx of nationals of Western 
countries, particularly high-class specialists posted by their companies and young graduates who 
find it difficult to begin a career in their home countries, seems to be a qualitatively important 
novelty. In order to help imagine the volume of this influx, one may quote an estimated number 
of Western migrants in the Czech Republic in 1997. While slightly over 15,000 of them were 
holders of long-term residence permits, and about 9,000 of business or work permits, as many as 
30,000 to 40,000 were employed without the permit required (Drbohlav, 1998). 
As a result of these trends, some of the countries: the Czech Republic, Slovakia and 
Hungary34 have become net immigration countries, and in some of their areas, multinational 
communities have flourished, with Prague, where foreigners already account for over 10 per cent 
of the population, being the most significant example. Other countries, such as Lithuania, Poland 
and Romania follow suit, with their emigration systematically diminishing and immigration 
growing. 
                                                                                       
34 Also Croatia, but for quite different reasons. 
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It seems evident from the above considerations that the influx of people into Central and 
Eastern European countries is characterised by a high degree of illegality. Illegality in a variety 
of shades, incidentally: sometimes illegal border crossing occurs, in other cases the permitted 
period of stay is exceeded, in yet others there is unregistered stay or activity. It is often the case 
that whole migrant families reside in a host country without legalisation for as long as several 
years, which slowly forces them out to the margin of society, preventing them from getting a 
proper education and regular employment, from participation in the social security and health 
care systems, not to mention other forms of participation in public life. 
Proceeding to the third important group of inflows of aliens observed in the countries of 
the region that is westbound transit, one should note in the first place its strictly illicit nature. 
Furthermore, the transit in question is increasingly supported by a vast network of trafficking 
organisations operating on an international scale. 
Thanks to their newly liberalised migration policies facilitating border-crossing, 
convenient geographic situation and lack of experience in combating illegal migration, Central 
and Eastern European countries have made an excellent anteroom or waiting room before the 
final stage of a migrants journey from his home country to the target country (which mostly 
turns out to be Germany). This role falls principally to the Czech Republic and Poland as 
countries bordering Germany, the most important target country in European migrations. A 
similar function is performed, though on a smaller scale, by countries bordering Austria 
(Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, and, again, the Czech Republic). Migrants are trafficked directly 
into the West from Central and Eastern European countries also to Italy (from Slovenia or, by 
sea, from Albania) and Greece (from Albania, the former Yugoslav republic of Macedonia and 
Bulgaria). The other countries of the region play the role of mobilisation centres or intermediate 
links in migrant trafficking. Of particular significance in this context are the countries of the CIS, 
with considerable stretches of their borders poorly marked or unguarded. Thus, the present-day 
westbound transit migration is a common problem for the countries of the region. 
According to estimates by Central and Eastern European countries, some 150,000 to 
250,000 migrants from Asia and Africa stay in their territories at any given time, awaiting 
trafficking into the West. According to a recent estimate by Tajikistan, the first transit country 
for many of the trafficked migrants, about 20,000 Afghan nationals stay in its territory at any 
given time, prepared for a further organised journey (Olimova, 1998). The numbers of migrants 
in traffic staying in the territories of countries such as Russia, Ukraine and Belarus are even 
considerably greater. Here is another example. In 1997 alone, some 1,600 convoys with illegal 
migrants in transit were detained in Poland, including 215 in excess of 10 people. An estimated 
30,000 to 50,000 migrants are trafficked annually from Poland to Germany (Okólski, 1999a). 
Reports from the Czech Republic allow a similar estimate. While the ethnic composition of the 
group of trafficked migrants varies considerably, the inhabitants of the Indian subcontinent 
(Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka) have recently prevailed. Persons with 
Algerian, Chinese, Iraqi, Iranian, Somali and Vietnamese passports are often found among them 
as well. 
The trafficking in aliens in some of the Central and Eastern European countries, including 
occasional smuggling from the West, is a relatively new derivative phenomenon. The latter 
occurrence may be illustrated by the smuggling of Vietnamese (awaiting deportation to their 
country from Germany) into Poland. The trafficking in Ukrainian and Romanian minors and 
bringing them into Hungary for the purpose of prostitution, and the trafficking in Vietnamese 
nationals and inserting them in Poland in connection with illegal employment at firms owned by 
other Vietnamese are, for example, relatively large-scale phenomena. 
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Migrant trafficking is becoming a highly profitable and, at the same time, well-organised 
illegal activity, in which use is made of modern technologies (including heavy military 
equipment) and of international connections between criminal groups, as well as of links 
between offenders and the border guards or the police. Given its profitability and the high, 
definitely not diminishing, demand for the services of trafficking networks on the part of 
potential migrants, it may be expected to become a lasting phenomenon. 
Summing up this description of the new migration phenomena in Central and Eastern 
Europe, the following conclusions may be drawn: 
- while the international mobility of the residents of the region has grown considerably, 
the main flows are directed into the countries of the region; 
- forms or types of migration flows and the links of the region with the other parts of the 
globe have become greatly diversified; 
- it follows from the two characteristics mentioned above that the region has become a 
new important unit in the global migration space; 
- besides common features accounting for similarity between the countries of the region, 
there are characteristics clearly distinguishing countries from one another; 
- there are strong migration magnets in the region (Croatia, the Czech Republic, Poland, 
Russia and Hungary), as well as out-migration areas, sending out migrants attracted by the 
aforementioned magnets, or by other ones outside the region (Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova, 
Romania and Ukraine), and countries experiencing migration on a very moderate scale 
(Lithuania and Slovakia); 
- in terms of the intensity of migration flows, the following types of countries may be 
distinguished: the first, with strong inflow but weak outflow (the Czech Republic and Hungary); 
the second, with strong inflow and outflow (Croatia, Poland, Russia and Romania); the third, 
with weak inflow but strong outflow (Albania, Belarus, Bulgaria, Moldova and Ukraine); and the 
fourth, with weak inflow and outflow (Lithuania and Slovakia); 
- finally, there is a small number of countries in the region (mainly Russia) where 
large masses of displaced persons have emerged, awaiting return home or a further journey, 
i.e. a phenomenon being a starting point for further intensified migration, while some other 
countries (mainly Bosnia) remain largely abandoned by persons in need of temporary refuge, 
and thus are bound to experience an intensive wave of returns in the future; on the other 
hand, in some countries (such as Poland, Russia and Hungary), unlike most of the others, 
embryos of new, permanent migrant communities have emerged, which in turn means that 
these countries will need to solve the problems of integration of aliens. 
 
4.6. Europe - the mecca of exilees, displaced persons and refugees 
 As I was trying to point out, it was not the inflow of people from the East that imprinted 
the 1990s migration trends in Western Europe. Instead, such a role was assumed by a massive 
influx of asylum seekers from various areas in a need of protection. It might be estimated that 
between 1989 and 1994 over 3.5 million foreigners entered that part of Europe either as asylum 
or temporary protection seekers, of whom 2.9 million belonged to the former category, of whom 
in turn 1.3-1.4 million originating from non-European countries (the South). To be sure, the 
annual average number of asylum seekers recorded in Europe in 1995-1997 fell to a half of the 
exceptionally high 1991-1993 level, but it remained elevated relative to much of the 1980s and 
the earlier period. 
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The number of those persons arriving in Western European countries started to grow 
rapidly in the late 1980s when many of the countries implemented a new generation of restrictive 
rules and procedures concerning immigration. It is very likely that the flow of migrants denied 
by a number of western countries entry in capacity of family members, relatives, fiancées, etc. 
has partly been diverted to the asylum channel. In the early 1990s a host of other factors 
contributed to the growth in the number of asylum seekers, the most important being probably 
the flight of refugees from the former FSR Yugoslavia. 
 In 1993, around the climax time of the asylum seekers inflow to Western Europe, ex-
Yugoslavs accounted for approx. 32 per cent of the total35. Germany, by far the major receiving 
country36, recorded a sudden rise in the number of asylum seekers from Yugoslavia - from 
22,000 in 1990 to 122,000 in 1992 (95,000 in 1993), and in their share in the total - from 11 per 
cent to 28 per cent. In the peak year (1992) ex-Yugoslavs were followed by citizens of two other 
former communist countries, namely Romanians and Bulgarians in the ranking of major 
applying nationalities, and these three nationalities accounted for 59 per cent of all asylum 
seekers. Obviously a large part of those persons would have entered Germany as migrants 
provided no tightening in immigration policy had taken place. On the other hand, recording those 
persons as asylum seekers obscured the trend of East-West migration in the early 1990s, which 
was discussed earlier. 
 Another important nation, which in the early 1990s chose the asylum channel as means 
of entering Germany, was Turkey whose citizens were particularly affected by earlier 
immigration policy restrictions37. A few other Asian nations that counted in that inflow included 
Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Vietnam. On the whole, between 1990 
and 1992 the number of Asian asylum seekers in Germany increased from 24,000 to 56,000 
(Turkey not included). Even more spectacular than that was the rise in asylum-seeking by 
citizens of African countries who before 1989 did so rather sporadically. Over the period of the 
following five years (1988-1992), however, its incidence rose by factor 10, to reach 67,000 
(1992)38. 
The experience of various European countries suggests that after a relatively short time, a 
large (if not predominant) part of asylum seekers and persons given temporary protection have 
turned de facto or de jure immigrants. A comparative study of the effects of recent national 
policies towards the representatives of the latter category conducted in three Scandinavian 
countries revealed that despite sharp differences between those policies, the ultimate effect was 
the same: the migrants almost in corpore have become settled (Schwartz, 1998)39. This might be 
seen as one of the arguments implying that in the assessments of the European migration trends 
in the late 1980s and early 1990s more attention should be given to the flows of people 
requesting various kinds of protection or assistance as an alternative form of immigration. 
                                                                                       
35 In that year the countries comprising European Economic Area (19 countries) recorded 554,000 asylum seekers of 
whom 177,000 were from ex-Yugoslavia (Eurostat, 1995). 
36 58 per cent of asylum seekers in Western Europe, both from all countries and also Yugoslavia taken separately. 
37 Negligible quantities of Turks were recorded among asylum seekers in the early 1980s (below 5,000 per annum), 
their number started growing in the second half of that decade to reach 28,000 in 1992. 
38 The national composition of those applicants was very unstable, but the following might be mentioned among 
major nationalities: Algeria, Togo, Ghana and Nigeria. 
39 Of three countries concerned: Denmark, Norway and Sweden, the first decided to pursue a clearly restrictive 
policy towards the asylum seekers or displaced persons from Bosnia, aiming at sending those persons back home as 
soon as possible, whereas the third from the very beginning aimed at their integration in the host society. After some 
time the three countries were compelled to follow the same policy, i.e. the policy of integration. 
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Finally, an observation might be made regarding the seeming paradox of Europe hosting 
growing numbers of refugees or asylum seekers not only originating from remote areas of the 
world but also, quite often, lacking developed networks in destination countries. For it should 
rather be expected that those persons would seek safety next to their home countries. Two 
complementary reasons why this is by no means the rule might be suggested here. First, a 
considerable proportion among them are genuine migrants whose preferred destination is the 
well-off core of the world economy and for whom the asylum channel might have turned out 
the easiest (if not the only available) way of getting there. Second, globalisation - which, 
according to Hoffmann-Nowotny (1991) is increasingly influenced by the Europeanisation of 
values and mass culture - legitimises and makes technically feasible the effort to become a part 
of the Old Continent by people from all around the world, even though this may require a 
lengthy migration and a number of heavy sacrifices. 
 
 4.7. European migration of privileged ethnic minorities 
 Migration which was ethnicity-driven, especially the migration whose major effect was to 
be the ethnic homogenisation of the population in the countries of origin and destination, 
deserves a succinct discussion here, if only to complement the list of flows that mattered for 
European migration in the past two decades. Although condition sine qua non for those 
movements to materialise might be seen in the European history, recently they have been 
triggered off or accelerated by the political reconfiguration of the continent (and the world 
system) that began with the falling down of the Soviet system. 
 That migration, which almost exclusively involved people living in Central and Eastern 
Europe, erupted in the late 1980s, after a long spell of the levelling off that followed the post-
Second World War intensified movements40. Leaving aside involuntary movements caused by 
the ethnic cleansing within the former FSR Yugoslavia, four major directions of the migration of 
ethnic unmixing seemed to have dominated the trend41: 
 - ethnic Germans from Central and Eastern Europe to Germany; 
 - ethnic Russians from the Soviet successor states to Russia42; 
 - ethnic Jews from the ex-USSR to Israel, Germany and the United States, and 
 - ethnic Hungarians from Romania and Yugoslavia (Serbia)43 to Hungary. 
 It might be estimated that between 1988 and 1996 the four directions that crucially 
contributed to the ethnicity-motivated outflow from Central and Eastern Europe, embraced as 
many as approx. 5.7 million persons including 2.5 million ethnic Germans, 2.4 million ethnic 
Russians, 600,000 ethnic Jews and 100,000 ethnic Hungarians. Taken as a whole, it was 
probably one of the most sizeable flows observed in Europe over the last 10 years or so. The fact 
that a large part of those movements is hardly accounted for in statistics and analyses of 
international migration, implies a severe bias in our understanding of contemporary population 
movements in Europe. 
                                                                                       
40 Important exceptions during that levelling-off period, whose beginning was marked by the proclamation of the 
cold war, included a massive migration of ethnic Germans (and to a lesser extent ethnic Jews) from Poland, and of 
ethnic Poles from the ex-USSR which took place in the second half of the 1950s, and in case of ethnic Germans 
from Poland also in the second half of the 1970s. 
41 Other, less important directions comprised ethnic Finns, Greeks and Poles from the former Soviet Union, ethnic 
Turks from Bulgaria and respective flows of Czechs and Slovaks within the ex-Czechoslovakia. 
42 In a similar manner, but in much smaller scale, migration of ethnic Ukrainians to Ukraine (or Russia), ethnic 
Belarussians to Belarus (or Russia), and Tatars to Crimea (Ukraine). 
43 Also, but in small numbers, from Ukraine and Slovakia. 
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Much of the (discussed here) recent ethnic movements in Europe have been occurring 
under circumstances of no aggravating tension or no nagging need to leave the country of origin. 
Moreover a large part of migrants comprised persons whose ancestors had settled in the countries 
of origin generations ago, and who had been weakly tied to their symbolic homelands. 
Ultimately, the argument of ethnic homogenisation in case of that flow seems rather doubtful in 
view of that, simultaneously, the sending and receiving countries have been the ground of 
considerable inflow of other people representing various, often culturally diverse, ethnicities. It 
seems therefore legitimate to tentatively conclude that, perceived within a broad perspective of 
contemporary migration trends, the ethnicity-driven flow of people which has been recently 
observed in Europe, might seem somehow anachronic. 
Turning to the differentia specifica of that flow, it was quite distinct relative inter alia to 
intra-EU movements of migrant workers, immigration on family reunion grounds, inflow of 
asylum seekers, assisted illegal migration or East-West movements of labour as it primarily 
stemmed from the causes rooted in the history of Europe rather than relatively recent factors, like 
the new course of globalisation or European regionalisation. Admittedly, the fall of 
communism has either paved the way for a part of ethnicity-spurred flow or triggered off another 
part of that flow. On the other hand, in frequent instances the migrants were motivated (if not 
tempted) by perspectives of living in a more efficient institutional set up and more wealthy 
environment, and to a large degree prompted to migrate due to a wide access to relevant 
information and transportation networks. The underlying single factor, however, proved to be the 
past intra-European political and economic developments. In particular, it turned out that the 
heritage of some past multi-ethnic empires has continued to bear heavily on ethnic relations in a 
number of European nation states, not to mention the respective impact of the Yalta agreement. 
As Brubaker asserts, recent European migration of ethnic unmixing, despite great internal 
diversity of that flow, and a variety of direction-specific determinants (from country- or group-
level to individual level determinants), had one important thing in common. These migrations 
have all been generated by the reconfiguration of political space along national lines (1998, 
1063). Other similarities included uniform implication of the movements from relatively better-
off to a relatively less well-off country and their taking place under circumstances of some 
special openness on the part of the receiving country, derived from its understanding of itself as 
being a homeland (Brubaker, 1998, 1064). Moreover, quite often, they involved the 
inconsistency between the legal (or embedded in political rhetoric) notion of co-etnicity adopted 
in the receiving country and the respective (widely adopted) customary criteria or self-
identification which made the process of co-ethnics integration rather difficult. 
 Despite the deep cultural and ethnic diversity of current movements - in all their forms - 
of people in Europe, it is still possible that the shrinking pool of potential ethnicity-driven 
migrants will soon bring that flow to a negligible size and bring about an increased ethnic 
homogenisation of Central and Eastern European countries. It is, however, also possible that in 
many cases these migrations will not so much alleviate ethnic conflict in the country of origin 
but that they will rather contribute to worsening ethnic conflict in the receiving country. 
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4.8. Towards summing up: has Pandoras box really been opened up? 
 In the assessment of recent population movements in Europe it might be tempting to draw 
the following line of reasoning. Throughout the 1960s and into the 1970s many European 
countries actively encouraged the immigration of foreign labour44, though usually with the 
intention of employing migrant workers for a fixed (shorter rather than longer) time and sending 
them back home upon the expiration of a contract. This had led to an extremely intensive influx 
of foreigners, mainly from the then sending countries of southern Europe and certain countries of 
the western borderland, i.e. the Maghreb countries, the former FSR Yugoslavia and Turkey. At 
the same time, the measures taken by Western European countries had aroused great 
expectations in out-migration regions, and contributed to the establishment of efficient migration 
networks, facilitating further migration. 
 After 1973, however, the recruitment of foreign labour was abandoned, which 
nevertheless failed to halt migration that, for mainly tactical reasons and out of necessity 
assumed the form of family migration. As the West gradually tightened the relevant laws and 
procedures in response, and eventually slowed down the inflow of foreigners arriving to join a 
family member or to marry a resident of a given country, aliens began to avail themselves on a 
mass scale of the opportunities offered by asylum regulations. However, as in the early 1990s 
stricter regulations were introduced in this area as well, for many Southerners, and, to a lesser 
degree, Easterners, using the services of professional networks that assist illegal migration 
became the only way to fulfil their plans connected with life in the West. 
 Since the middle of the 1990s, thanks to various preventive measures adopted by 
European countries45, the inflow of unwanted (and illegal) migrants has slightly diminished. At 
the same time, as scanty but consistent evidence suggests, the number of people staying in 
transit countries and awaiting trafficking into Western Europe has risen. It might be 
hypothesised that only the time span needed to execute a migration, not the number of migrants, 
has changed over the last four to five years, and that in the immediate future, once the traffickers 
have successfully adapted to newly introduced controls and checks, illegal migration will grow 
again. 
 Should this order and causation in the developments related to the European migration be 
the case, one might legitimately compare the depicted trend to the proverbial opening up of 
Pandoras box. 
 The above offered way of reasoning, however, does not seem to fully match the 
complexity of that trend. At least two important reservations might be raised here. First, the 
pattern of inflow to Western Europe has been by no means ethnically and geographically stable 
over time. Second, what has been sufficiently evidenced in the foregoing discussion, the bulk (in 
not just a predominant share) of the inflow resulted from the intra-European political change. As 
for the latter factor, the changes expected for the near future, by inter alia fostering the 
regionalisation in Europe46, should be conducive to alleviating the migration pressure per se. 
 There will still, however, remain the question of migration pressures whose origins are 
non-European countries. Although many relevant factors are hard to predict accurately, it seems 
that only structural instability in countries bordering the unifying European space (above all, in 
Russia) would activate the potential inherent to those pressures. Otherwise the actual outcome 
might be vestigial flows of people from those countries with no practical consequences for 
stability, security and welfare in Europe. 
                                                                                       
44 As a matter of fact, France and Britain started this even earlier (in late 1950s). 
45 Those measures included closer international collaboration in combating illicit migration, creating an effective 
screening buffer zone around the united Europe, applying more advanced techniques of the surveillance of external 
borders, etc. 
46 This would include strengthening the international co-operation in Europe, stabilising politically new European 
democracies, and institutionalising the population movements in the enlarged European space. 
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5. Issues of the late 1990s: a review of challenges faced by Europe 
 5.1. Melting pot Europe vis-à-vis new great migrant communities: the patterns and puzzles of integration 
 Irrespective of how the recent migration trends in Europe might be viewed from the 
perspectives of various disciplines and by various scholars, the opinion that over the last quarter 
of this century a large majority of European countries has received an unprecedented flow of 
foreigners is unquestionable. Willingly or not, Europe to a large degree has become a continent 
of immigrants, and its many countries have been, or are being, converted into multiethnic, 
pluricultural societies. The question therefore arises whether the social fabric of those ethnically 
and culturally reconfigurated societies have been significantly affected, and if so, how. 
 Arango, in his recent insightful analysis, arrived at largely sceptical conclusions: the 
prevailing orientation in the integration policies and popular feelings toward foreign residents in 
European countries seems to be restrictionist and exclusionary. As a result the immigrants are 
subject to temporariness and the limitation of their rights, and (implicitly or not) have been 
relegated to the position of underclass on the social ladder. Regardless of the way in which they 
are incorporated into society, most migrants suffer from political and also, in the case of a 
considerable proportion of them, social exclusion. In some countries they increasingly play the 
role of scapegoat when it comes to social tension or when social solidarity is at stake47. 
 This is mostly due to the framework [within which] immigration is bound to be seen as a 
threat, or at least a nuisance, to the ideal cohesion of the nation state, rather than a contribution to 
its formation or enhancement (Arango, 1998, 11). Such a conclusion should have not come as a 
surprise for Europe where a past of out-migration and a tradition of exclusionary conceptions of 
nationhood have left strong cultural underpinnings that militate against the full incorporation of 
migrants in society (ibidem, 3). 
 Could this picture possibly be reconciled with the motto of the present conference: unity 
in diversity? My answer would be rather cautious: yes, though to a limited degree only. The 
justification for this somewhat more optimistic diagnosis can be found in the social and 
demographic statistics (and survey data) of various countries which suggest a gradual -though far 
from being fast, universal and proportionate - convergence of indicators for the native 
populations and immigrants. 
 A recent analysis carried out by Courbage (1998) that focuses on the behavioural patterns 
of immigrants from the Maghreb, implies that the demographic indicators (pertaining to fertility, 
nuptiality and mortality) display the fastest convergence rate of the immigrants on the indigenous 
populations, followed by the indicators that concern the educational structure and the 
composition of households. The lowest level (or the slowest pace) of convergence is found in 
employment characteristics (the composition by skill or sector, unemployment level, female 
participation, etc.)48. On the other hand, despite the fact that the integration of migrants in 
Western Europe, as measured by the convergence indicators, proceeds; the differences between 
individual receiving countries concerning the pace of that process tend to persist, which in turn 
depends to a large degree on the migration policies of respective countries49. 
                                                                                       
47 Interestingly, the degree of migrants integration seems to be inversely correlated with the share of immigrants in 
the host population. Therefore the greater the number of migrants in society the higher incidence of non-acceptance 
of foreigners, anti-immigrant feelings and xenophobia, and the higher likelihood of exclusion. 
48 Reference to other relevant studies can be found i.a. in:  Coleman (1993), Coleman (1994), Golini and Bisio 
(1993), Lesthaeghe and Surkyn (1995), Lodewijckx (1998),  Maffioli and DellAtti (1998), OECD (1991) and 
OECD (1998). 
49 See e.g. Coleman (1994) and Courbage (1998). Maffioli and DellAtti (1998) seem to suggest that something 
more than the migration policy of the receiving country, namely the individual migrants experience might be of 
greater importance than the migrants cultural background in shaping her/his behaviour and ultimately leading to 
integration. 
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 Conspicuously, the difficulty in a rapid integration (and, in consequence, the phenomenon 
of discrimination or ostracism) can also be observed in the case of migrants from culturally non-
distant countries. Probably the most striking example is that of the ethnic Germans who have 
recently resettled in Germany but are said to have experienced various forms of isolation, 
deprivation or exclusion there (e.g. non-acceptance by the indigenous population, segregation in 
the place of residence, below-average performance at school, high incidence of pathologies 
among the youth, difficulty in skill adjustment, relatively high unemployment among youth and 
females)50. 
 It appears, however, that many people who are a part of the recent migration wave in 
Europe, despite all odds and hindrances on the part of the host societies, display a strong 
determination, if not eagerness, to adapt and integrate. In the long run those migrants are likely 
to be fully included. On the other hand, some migrants come with the intention to limit 
themselves to work only, and ultimately to return to their home countries51, and some others, 
who are in an irregular situation in the receiving country, by definition have no chances to 
integrate52. This contributes to the perception of migrant communities in many European 
countries as conglomerates and highly heterogeneous. That factor might be paired with a great 
concentration of the immigrant population which makes a number of social issues in certain 
provinces or cities in those provinces overwhelmed with the bare fact of foreigners presence 
(Coleman, 1994). 
 Nonetheless, in many European countries the perception of immigration does not seem to 
match the reality: the evolution of the former and the latter are clearly divergent. Moreover in 
view of the migration trends observed in Europe during the last decade, and particularly the 
recent five years which were marked by the declining relative proportion of the inflow from non-
European countries, and bearing in mind that increasingly a lions share of the migration volume 
in Europe is accounted for by the intra-European movements of people, it could be argued that 
the impediments in migrants integration stem above all from internal problems encountered by 
individual receiving countries. A striking disproportion between the actual levels and pace of 
growth of immigrant flows on the one hand, and the degree of migrants exclusion and 
xenophobia on the part of the host population on the other hand, might strongly testify to that. In 
other words, it might be Europe itself - with its international disparities or incoherence, the crisis 
of liberal principles, etc. - where the primary causes of that phenomenon are to be sought. 
 
5.2. Transnationalism: towards a supranational/postnational identity of migrants 
 Putting the mainstream of people migrating recently to European countries aside, a 
growing importance might be ascribed to the flows of people for whom the social integration in 
the host country is not an issue. Those flows embrace persons who are either (actually and 
willingly) short-term migrants and by definition do not seek social integration, or those who 
come for a relatively long stay (e.g. exceeding one year) but the basic function (and the main 
purpose) of their movement precludes that kind of integration or makes it a matter of relatively 
low priority. Below I reflect on the latter. 
                                                                                       
50 See e.g. Dietz (1997), Koller (1997) and Muenz and Ohliger (1997). 
51 This seems to be particularly common in Italy and certain other countries of Southern Europe. 
52 Moreover, as Coleman ascertains, illegal immigration undermines the position of existing migrants and raises 
popular feeling against them (1994, 41). 
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Typically, the long-term migrants whose social integration in the host country is neither a 
prerequisite for performing/achieving major objectives of their migration, nor its absence in any 
significant way harms the migrant and the host country, include diplomatic personnel and foreign 
students. In the last decade or so, however, this is also (increasingly) the case of highly skilled 
employees of TNCs, representatives of various international NGOs and other international service 
providers. Recent estimates for the western part of the continent suggest that the share of those 
persons might range from over 25 per cent (the Netherlands) to approx. 60 per cent (Norway and 
the United Kingdom) of all migrant workers, and imply its gradual rise (e.g. France, Germany, 
Luxembourg, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom) (Salt, 1997a). This trend has also been visible 
in Central and Eastern Europe (OECD, 1998). 
 The specificity of that phenomenon can be illustrated by using the example of specialists or 
managers employed by TNCs. Above all, as noted by Rudolph (1997, 13), internationally mobile 
managers/experts are privileged in different respects: many countries have passed exceptional 
regulations concerning their access to the territory and to the labour market; their economic 
integration is primarily related to their skill level (and not to their ethnicity) and they rarely run the 
risk of dequalified employment. Secondly, those persons are to a large degree transnational 
internal migrants, which means that their recruitment takes place from within corporate internal 
labour markets, and passes by the international market or market of a given country (Salt, 1997a). 
Finally, the movements of such professionals are perceived as an instrument of the globalisation 
process, especially of the transfer of both functional skills and corporate culture (norms, values 
and habits matching the new standards of organisation and technology) between various economies 
(Castles and Miller, 1993). 
 Rudolphs analysis pertaining to the post-1990 European experts flows from the West to 
the East substantiates the validity of this description (e.g. Rudolph, 1997; Rudolph and Hillmann, 
1997). It is evident from that analysis that the migrants identify themselves with a multiplicity of 
functions, in particular with that of restructuring at company, branch and national economy, 
therefore linking the transformation to the globalisation process. 
In effect, the employees of TNCs and other migrants of similar kinds, because of the range 
of in-between ethnicisation configurations with varying home-host compositions and emphases 
(Morawska, forthcoming, 21), are perceived as a vehicle of the postnational genre. Indeed, an 
entirely new trend emerges in Europe (and elsewhere in the world) whose conceptualisation 
assumes creolisation, i.e. permeable, flux and multiple identities of the migrants ensued by their 
living in several societies simultaneously with a complex web of social relations characteristic to 
those societies (Glick-Schiller et al., 1996). This will undoubtedly pose an additional challenge to 
many European countries, especially to those components of their migration policy which reflect 
the philosophy of nation-state. 
Also, symptoms of the setting up of transnational migrant communities whose founding 
principle is not necessarily tight social integration with the host country, but which have been built 
upon the ethnic origin of migrants rather than their skills were recently observed in Europe (e.g. 
Cesari, 1998 and Haug, 1998). Nyiri (1997), for instance, has described the process of organisation 
of the new overseas Chinese communities in Europe (including some countries of Central and 
Eastern Europe, notably Hungary) whose major trait is the high level of internal integration and 
their strong political and economic affiliation with China. For those communities relations with the 
host society do not seem of primary importance. They have been created thanks to the world-wide 
Chinese commercial web, interwoven through traditional family links, which invests large capital 
in various destination countries and is capable of flexibly moving the stock and distribution centre 
from one country to another. Nyiris analysis is concluded with the following admonition: A fast 
and massive Chinese migration to other parts of the world is likely to bring Chinas alternative 
globalisation into conflict with that of the West if not carefully managed (1997, 19), and with a 
quotation from Habermas: the state must respond to the challenge of deterritorialised nationalism 
by actively engaging, through incentives and law enforcement, transnational migrant communities 
in the discourse which defines the political culture of the host society. 
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5.3. Incomplete migration: a phenomenon of transnational marginalisation 
 Quite different problems for migrants and sending/receiving societies are posed by the 
phenomenon of incomplete migration. By the incomplete migration (which has already been 
referred to in this paper) I mean the specific outcome of an unfinished mobility transition (in 
Zelinskis terms) in countries of Central and Eastern Europe which left a large part of the rural 
population halfway through: between its employment in agriculture and residence in a town53. Its 
origins might be sought in the abrupt decline of migration [from the rural areas] and the rapid 
rise of commuting, because the failure of initial socialist industrialisation in the 1950s denied 
largely agricultural workers recruited for urban labour force as manual or low-skilled workers 
[...] urban residence (Fuchs and Demko, 1978). After the expiration of demand for low-skilled 
commuters or seasonal industrial workers in the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, many 
persons (predominantly Poles) who found themselves in such a situation begun income-seeking 
activities (mainly, petty trade) in neighbouring former socialist countries. This evolved into the 
present form of the phenomenon, popular in many countries of Central and Eastern Europe (e.g. 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Ukraine), which is characterised by the following traits (Okólski, 
1998c): 
 - migrants enter the host country under the guise of tourists to trade or work informally; 
 - migration is considered by the household as an alternative and supplementary source of 
the income, often within the household strategy of income diversification and minimisation of 
risks; 
 - although each flow involves only weeks or days spent in the host country, the migrants 
do that repeatedly and, in effect, many of them work for a considerable part of the year outside 
the home country. 
 Due to the very low cost of living of the migrants households, incomplete migration -
despite low migrants pay - has proved to be a relatively efficient way to generate income under 
transitionary circumstances. On the other hand, the ensuing effect of that phenomenon is inter 
alia prolonged precariousness of migrants economic situation, family life and, generally, social 
role. It prevents the migrants from any form of integration in the host country, and at the same 
time, in the case of people from the rural areas, sustains their socially marginal position in the 
home country, or, in the case of the inhabitants of urban areas, contributes to their 
marginalisation (Frejka et al., 1998). 
 Though it might be argued that the people who resort to that mobility have become 
another form (strikingly different from that represented by the privileged highly skilled 
professionals) of transnational migrants, the function of their movements is only peripheral. The 
solution to the problem of transnational marginalisation of those migrants might not come 
instantly nor easily. On the contrary, many factors such as their low level of education, an 
accrued strong habit of flexible behaviours, the demanding socio-economic milieu of the 
transforming home country, and the existence - in frequent cases - of a safety niche composed 
of a family home and a subsistence-oriented plot of land and supported by extended and strong 
family ties, suggest - in the long run - that a great proportion of the persons taking part in 
incomplete migration will neither be able to cope with the challenges of the more and more 
modern society nor will they be sufficiently covered by the protective umbrella of the state. 
Therefore coming to terms with the transnational marginalisation of current migrants from 
Central and Eastern European countries might require the passing of the generation involved. 
                                                                                       
53 It partly involves the residents of declining small towns who were unable to move to cities. 
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5.4. Migration business and its undesirable consequences 
 In a recent paper, Salt (1998a, 4) has developed the concept of the migration business as a 
system of institutionalised networks consisting of organisations, agents and individuals each of which 
stands to gain some form of remuneration. In other words, there are vested interests in the promotion 
of migration. According to this concept, migration is subject to an analysis in contractual terms, in 
contrast to an approach which has predominated until now and conceives international migration 
[...] as a relationship between, on the one hand, an individual or household moving for purposes of 
permanent settlement or work and, on the other, a government acting as gatekeeper for entry into a 
country and acquisition of its citizenship (Salt, 1998a, 3). 
 Below I leave aside the public business of migration and a large part of the private 
component of that business, and focus entirely on the illegitimate (thus undesirable) side of the latter. 
 A major part of that illegal business constitutes trafficking in persons or, in its reduced form: 
the smuggling of migrants. The importance of this phenomenon lies in the fact that for a large 
majority of the residents of many countries in the South (or - to a lesser extent - the East) no 
alternative option currently exists if they strive to migrate to the West. On the other hand, the 
activities of trafficking networks increasingly affect the numbers of actual migrants, as well as the 
selection of destination countries and the routes chosen. It might therefore be argued that trafficking 
in persons is, or might soon become, a significant factor contributing to the emergence of a new 
geographic pattern of migration. 
In contrast to many other illegitimate acts observed in the process of migration, an individual 
act of trafficking affects more than just one society and its consequences are probably more 
comprehensive and far reaching. Its prevention and combating seems even more arduous than other 
forms of illicit migrants behaviours. This is because trafficking in migrants involves international 
groups of organised crime and is closely linked with other illegal activities of those groups, and - last 
but not least - yields high profits. 
 Due to many factors, including the opening up of Eastern Europe to international movements 
of people around 1990 and the relatively favourable location of that part of the continent for illegal 
migrants, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe have recently become a major transit ground 
and vestibule (and, increasingly, a destination) for tens of thousands (annually) of foreigners 
smuggled or trafficked into Europe. A survey conducted in 1998 in Poland revealed the existence of 
two basic premises facilitating further growth of that phenomenon: the world-wide availability of 
contact points reaching out to the most remote and most difficult to access localities in Africa and 
Asia, and the well co-ordinated and effective functioning of the trafficking organisations (Okólski, 
1999a). 
 Despite enormously high (relative to the affluence of all countries of migrants origin) price 
of the trafficking54, a mechanism has been observed according to which increasingly money is paid 
to a trafficker (beforehand) by a future migrants employer (as a credit to the migrant) or (after 
successful arrival to the target country) by those (usually, relatives or other co-ethnics) who commit 
themselves to the migrants insertion at the ultimate destination. Another important finding implies 
the great role of the Russian mafia in running trafficking organisations. At least one-third of all 
studied cases displayed a very similar pattern: an unattended trip (often, Aeroflot flight) to Moscow 
(or other city in the ex-USSR), followed (after a shorter or longer wait to compose a migrants group) 
by an escorted trip to Kiev, Minsk or Vilnius, and (usually after the re-arrangement of the group) 
illegal entry to Poland. Those migrants explicitly pointed to travel arrangements, document issuance, 
transportation network, hiding on the route and border crossing as facilitated by Russian authorities 
(official tourist agents, diplomatic representatives, airline staff, policemen, military and border guard 
officers) who apparently closely collaborated with the traffickers. In turn, while in Poland, a large 
                                                                                       
54 The average price in the sample of migrants was around 3,000 US dollars per one person but 55 per cent of 
migrants paid more than 5,000 US dollars (25 per cent more than 12,000 US dollars). 
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part of the trafficked migrants is introduced to the government refugee services and - for the time 
when the final trafficking operation is prepared - placed in a refugee reception centre. Gradually, 
migrants - in newly composed groups - are further trafficked to Germany and other western countries 
(Okólski, 1999a). 
 Such modus operandi of migrant trafficking organisations brings a number of immediate, 
detrimental and socially unwanted, consequences to a country of transit or destination, which inter 
alia include the penetration of foreign (international) criminal networks and the undermining of the 
national asylum system. It spreads corruption of state officials, increases the incidence of crime, and 
involves violations of human rights, particularly the right to asylum. The costs of combating that 
phenomenon are immense. 
 The problem of migrant trafficking owes very much to the coincidence of two major political 
trends in Europe: the opening up of the former socialist countries to population movements (in the 
aftermath of the collapse of the communist system in Europe) and the closing of western European 
borders to migrants from the South (and certain countries of the East). An effective solution of this 
problem does not seem feasible without concerted counteraction on the part of both segments of the 
continent, and, ultimately, arriving at a common European migration policy, including the idea of 
uniform external borders. 
 5.5. Probable effects of the EU enlargement 
 Although the future enlargement of the European Union is still ahead of us, most likely by 
more than five years, the fact of the possible accession of six new countries, including five countries 
of Central and Eastern Europe seems to have already affected thinking of the changes in the 
migration trends, if not actual migration trends in Europe. The possibility of future eastbound 
extension of the external borders of the EU has stimulated the adaptation of candidate countries 
migration regulations to European standards and the tightening of the borders of the Czech 
Republic, Hungary and Poland. This resulted in the deceleration of the pace of the foreigners inflow, 
more efficient control over the movements of citizens of countries allowed visa-free entry and 
probably also the reduction in illegal immigration to these countries. On the other hand, a tendency to 
settle and eventually acquire citizenship of the host country (e.g. in the case of Vietnamese in Poland) 
has been observed among certain groups of migrants. Such a tendency might to some degree be 
linked with expectations among migrants from the countries with limited access to the European 
Union that once the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland (along with the other three candidates) are 
granted full membership in the EU, those immigrants will be able to automatically benefit from the 
free movement right within the Union. Nevertheless this phenomenon seems so far to be of 
negligible magnitude. 
 Whereas control over the inflow of foreigners to whom the EU restrictions apply is largely 
considered manageable in the candidate countries of Central and Eastern Europe, more clouds seem 
to surround the issue of future propensity of the citizens of those countries to seek employment in 
other EU countries provided the institutional barriers are abolished (Kerremans, 1997). Poland might 
serve as an illustration of the probable acute migration pressure. This might be so for at least two 
reasons. A primary consideration is demographic. Between 2001 and 2010 the working age 
population is expected to grow by nearly 700,000 in Poland while the corresponding total of 15 
countries of the EU may decline by over 1,100,000. The second argument pertains to the necessity of 
restructuring of Polish (highly fragmented and inefficient) agriculture, which presently gives 
employment to approx. 20 per cent of the labour force. Coming down with that percentage to the 
current level of Portugal (just above 10 per cent) by the year 2010 would require freeing some 2 
million agricultural workers. Spectacular as they may seem, however, these arguments are largely 
dubious: the above quoted increase in the size of the working age population in Poland will be a 
combination of a tremendous rise in the immobile age group (45 or over) and a decline (by a little 
more than 600,000) in the mobile group (up to the age 45) whereas the majority of the redundant 
agricultural labour will most likely (again predominantly due to ageing) become pensioners. 
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 Recent analyses strongly posit that no significant increase in migration for work in the 
EU labour market is likely from the candidate countries after their accession (e.g. Hars, 1998; 
Okólski and Stola, 1998). This seems to agree with an earlier conclusion arrived at by Tapinos 
(1994, 220): Legal barriers cannot be regarded as the main obstacles preventing migration and 
therefore the fear of mass immigration resulting solely from the removal of legal barriers in 
Central and Eastern Europe is probably unfounded. 
 However, the current political debate suggests a very careful approach of the EU 
countries to that issue. In view of this, following a very comprehensive analysis of the economic 
and political realities in the EU and Central and Eastern Europe, Morawska (1999) offers the 
probable scenario of the admission process which assumes that the accession will take place in 
2005, the transitional ten-year period after the formal admission will be introduced, and repeated 
delays in allowing the free international movements of persons will take place afterwards. This 
in turn, irrespective of the underlying rationale and harmful effects for the future development of 
Central and Eastern European countries and the future integration of Europe, would make the 
issue of the migration consequences of the accession irrelevant, for at least one generation. 
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6. Conclusions: does Europe still needs migrants? 
 The question I am going to address in the conclusion has already been forcefully put 
(and extensively discussed) by other authors (e.g. Angenendt, 1997; Coleman, 1993), which 
allows me to limit myself to a few comments stemming from the foregoing analysis. 
 First of all, in assessing the current or future European capacity in terms of the inflow 
and stock of migrants, it is essential to observe the changes in the nature of international 
migration in general and the European migration space in particular. It seems plausible, which 
has been recently emphasised by Salt (1997c, 5), that the term migration with its overtones 
of some notion of permanent settlement has become somehow obsolete, and we ought to 
regard migration as a sub-category of a more general concept of movement, embracing a 
wide variety of types and forms of human mobility each capable of metamorphosing into 
something else. On the other hand, Europe as an arena of international population movements 
needs to be conceived, on the one hand, as a component of global space, and, on the other 
hand, as a whole extending from the Urals to the Atlantic. 
 Referring to those remarks, it should be noted that recent European migrations were 
marked by intracontinental movements. Not only did relative significance of the inflow from 
other continents decline, but also the Europeans displayed substantially lower propensity to 
move beyond the boundaries of Europe. In addition, the short-term movements and 
paramigratory mobility have come to the fore. On the other hand, many forms and types of 
movements observed over the last 20 years or so, above all the mainstream of European 
migration, stemmed from the political conjuncture, and it would be rather unwise to consider 
them to be stable phenomena. 
 Nonetheless the dominant public perception of migration and, particularly, migrants 
presence in Europe, does sharply contrast with the conclusion denying the expansive nature of 
that phenomenon, especially with regard to the growth of immigration from the South. This is 
an important argument to seriously consider the hypothesis that the threshold of tolerance to 
aliens has been crossed in a number of European countries55. Even if such a hypothesis is 
plausible, however, it is not necessarily so much the movements of people over the last 10-20 
years that stand behind such heavily strained acceptance of the migrants by the indigenous 
populations but rather the accumulated outcome of migrations dating back to the 1950s or 
1960s. 
 In the real world the inflow of migrants, regardless of how strong, and even more so the 
presence - in its direct manifestations - of foreigners increasingly give rise to social concern 
and tensions in the host countries and threaten their internal stability/security. As noted by 
Hollifield (1999), some authors represent the view that the fears of excessive migrants 
participation in society, expressed - with a growing intensity - by the public since the 1980s, 
are not only rational but also justified. Irrespective of the arguments which allude to that a 
number of European countries might have reached the saturation point in admitting foreigners 
(e.g. Coleman, 1993) or the opposite arguments claiming endlessly beneficial effects of 
immigration (e.g. Gosh, 1994), it seems legitimate to ask whether Europe could have avoided 
the worst of the present tolerance crisis without resorting to radically more restrictive 
migration policies. 
 Here is a handful of reasons which might suggest the possibility of a different course of 
migration trends and the process of migrants integration in Europe, even under relatively 
liberal (more liberal than presently implemented or proposed) policies of the western European 
countries. 
                                                                                       
55 The argument of seuil de tolerance was coined in 1991 by the French President Mitterrand. 
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1. A large degree of tolerance of the shadow economy and, particularly, of the irregular 
labour market by the state, persisting in some of those countries, acts like a magnet for the flows of 
illegitimate migrants. Although since the 1970s irregular migrant workers have generally ceased to 
be tolerated in the West, the employers keep offering jobs to them (Brochmann, 1993, Stalker, 
1994)56. Introducing more appropriate sanctions against employers or their more effective 
enforcement in those countries might by itself have blunted the attraction of the informal market 
and brought down the number of unwanted migrants. 
 2. A considerable part of the migrants inflow ensues from seemingly incoherent migration 
policies of the countries of destination, characterised by instability of policy rules or discrepancies 
among those rules. For instance, the idea of free movement of people, which for a long time was 
postulated by a majority of western European countries, was perceived by migrants as 
contradictory to the tightening of controls on entry. Frequently, migrants after not being admitted 
felt deceived by this, and sought illegal entry. Another illustration of such incoherence presents 
changing principles applied by some countries to the so-called guest workers, which confused 
many temporary migrants and drove them into irregularity or to a path leading to permanence57. 
Finally different rules of admission employed to ethnically different categories of migrants, in 
particular, the granting of privileged status to some, seems to have multiplied the flow of persons 
who belong to the privileged58. 
 3. A culturally or economically selective approach to asylum seekers usually results in 
some sorts of adverse consequences, and encourages more members of particular cultural or 
economic groups to migrate (Levai, 1997; Zolberg et al., 1986). On the other hand, generally 
generous asylum laws play the role of a powerful stimulus for migrants from all over the world to 
take advantage of that generosity once the other migration channels are blocked (Zlotnik, 1998). 
Finally, internationally uncoordinated attitudes towards the asylum or temporary protection seekers 
either shift the flows of those persons to the countries offering those persons relatively more 
favourable terms of admission or raise their expectations according to these terms regardless of the 
actual country of residence (Schwartz, 1998). 
 4. Another factor of relevance is the rigidity of specific rules or regulations in individual 
countries of western Europe concerning the citizens of other countries, which seems to contribute 
to the hampering of the integration of migrants. Above all this pertains to the German attachment 
to jus sanguinis principle in the citizenship (and migrant intergration) policy of this country. This 
law, for instance, assumes the inclusion of the persons who for generations lived in an alien 
country but are known to have distant German ancestors, but at the same time the exclusion of the 
persons of non-German ancestry even though those person have been born and legally living in 
Germany for longer than one generation. In France, the rigid principle of the separation of 
fundamentally secular officialdom and privateness, with its possible religious beliefs and 
connections to church, might be quoted as another example. Particularly affected in this case seems 
the integration of Islamic migrants for whom the abrupt adjustments to the requirements of the host 
society is often inconceivable, and thus might lead them in the opposite direction, i.e. towards 
fundamentalism and militancy (Hollifield, 1999; Todd, 1994). It does not need to be argued that 
the migrants separateness and marginalisation, which at least in part results from that inflexibility 
of integration policies, only fuel xenophobia among the indigenous population, and introduce a 
significant bias to the perception of immigration and migrants integration in the public opinion. 
                                                                                       
56 Boehning and Werquin (1990, 32) assert that the numerical importance of the irregular employment of foreigners 
deepens largely on the ease with which employers can make use of this labour reserve that is docile and cheap. 
57 Such situations with reference to Germany are discussed in Weiner and Hanami (1998). 
58 As a conspicuous example might serve the 1989 flow of ethnic Germans from Poland to Germany. In that single 
year, on the eve of the expected tightening of admission rules by Germany, a quarter of million Polish citizens of 
this kind was granted the (privileged) status of Aussiedler. This number approximated the total size of German 
minority in Poland, as estimated by the German Red Cross in the early 1970s. It seems that, to large degree, that 
flow reflected the herd instinct (aroused by exceptional opportunities) rather than the genuine need of the reunion 
with a symbolic homeland (Okólski, 1999b). 
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 5. The list of other pertinent factors, which due to limited space cannot be discussed here, 
seems quite long and includes inter alia such crucial issues as, on the one hand, the discrepancies 
between the entry measures (e.g. control of borders and regulation of labour markets) and 
integration measures (e.g. migrant rights) in migration policies of the receiving countries, and, on 
the other hand, the whole gamut of factors that sustain enormously wide income gaps between 
countries or the segmented national labour markets59. 
 Bearing in mind the above listed arguments, it appears that migration pressure on Europe 
on the part of non-European migrants, be it a real fact or just a threat, could be perceptibly 
alleviated, even under the present institutional arrangements in Europe and within relatively short 
time. Also visible are the symptoms of a shift in that direction in the distant future. Those 
symptoms include inter alia a gradual emergence and development of regional migration spaces 
with their specific poles of attraction outside of Europe; slow but consistent development of the 
world economy with rising income levels and ever new countries advancing from the periphery 
to the median position and from the median position to the core; and as a consequence, the 
dispersion of the global migratory potential among the growing number of countries; and, 
finally, the determination of European states in their striving for an internally and internationally 
consistent (if not common) migration policy and their (already - since around 1995 - 
accomplished) preliminary successes in the curtailing of the illegal inflow of foreigners. 
 On the other hand, unquestionably (if only by sheer necessity), Europe will continue to be 
a part of the mainstream of the new course of globalisation, and will have to keep various 
channels of population movements open and permeable. The latter will probably be nourished by 
two powerful factors: the tradition of openness and pluralism (including multiculturalism), and a 
pragmatic and market-regulated demand for skills, talents and - last but not least - workers ready 
to accept jobs no longer wanted by the local labour force60. 
 Finally, it seems unlikely for Europe to stand aside insofar as the matters of the world 
order or global stability and security are concerned. Globalisation also means greater 
awareness among the poor of their underprivileged position in the world economy, and more 
articulated claims for being rescued from the poverty. The rich/poor divide and many other 
contradictions of the contemporary world call for continuous attention and searching for a 
solution. As Levai (1997, 183) notes, migration offers the evolutionary [and peaceful] course to 
reduce both the resulting political and economic tensions, the increasing labour unrest and labour 
distress. According to this logic, in choosing the lesser evil, European countries might be 
persuaded to receive, in the foreseeable future, more migrants than they would actually like to. 
                                                                                       
59 See e.g. Salt (1998b). 
60 Lim (1997) points to growing demand for live-up help due to the sharp increase in the demand for the care of the 
elderly in ageing western societies. It is believed that the cheap foreign labour will be instrumental in solving this 
problem. 
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